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GUILTY PLEAS IN WISCONSIN
ARTHUR N. BISHOP*
The national interest recently focused on guilty pleas has many
progenitors. One is the stark fact that the heaviest weight of the
criminal docket is cleared everywhere by pleas of guilty, most of
them negotiated. Another is the promulgation of standards by the
American Bar Association.1 Still another is the en banc entry of
the United States Supreme Court into the constitutional aspects
of such pleas. Add them all up, insert the population growth and
the mushrooming crime rate directly resultant from drug addic-
tion, and you come up with the truly modern problems the criminal
courts face: guilty pleas, "bargaining," the optimum in procedure,
and how to arrive at a just solution.
The goal, of course, is to insure that constitutional and proce-
dural mandates are fully observed and that pleas of guilty are
voluntarily entered, based on the simple, honest truth of genuine
guilt.
What follows is a review of the Wisconsin case law and how
the courts seek to achieve this goal.
CAPACITY; RIGHT TO COUNSEL, CONSTITUTIONAL COMPLIANCE
A survey of the cases indicates that the controlling factors in
determining capacity to enter a plea are age, education and mental
capacity A defendant of age seventeen with juvenile jurisdiction
waived, has been held competent to enter a felony guilty plea,2
while an eighteen year old with a tenth grade education who is
*B.B.A. 1947, University of Miami; M.B.A. 1948, University of Houston; J.D. 1955,
Southern Methodist University; Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Wayne County (Detroit)
Michigan; member of the Michigan, Texas and United States Supreme Court Bars. This is
part of a regionalized national series of articles on pleas of guilty and opinions expressed
are the writer's own.
1. See, for example, Note, The American Bar Associations Standards on Criminal
Justice and Wisconsin Statute Section 971.08, 1971 Wis. L. REv. 583.
2. Gibson v. State, 47 Wis. 2d 810, 177 N.W.2d 912 (1970) (Armed robbery, 10 years;
remanded for hearing on propriety of juvenile waiver).
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below average intelligence but not mentally defective has the ca-
pacity to offer a counselled plea of guilty. 3 A fortiori, no impedi-
ments regarding capacity exist as to a counselled thirty year old
high school graduate4 or as to a fifty year old with a prior prison
record.5 A person in a "dazed and upset" condition has been held
unable to enter a proper plea.' Where the record shows that the
defendant clearly understands the charges, there is no requirement
that the court ascertain the extent of the defendant's education or
general comprehension. 7
Similarly, the right to counsel is of no benefit to a defendant
incapable of understanding its significance. In the case of a nine-
teen year old who has no lawyer, the mere recitation that an attor-
ney will be provided is not sufficient unless the court takes steps
to ascertain whether defendant understands the right and conse-
quence of the plea.' Where the record shows that, had the defen-
dant been afforded counsel, the plea of guilty would likely not have
been entered, lack of a lawyer is fatal to plea validity? It was held
at one time that failure to appoint counsel in a non-capital case was
not a violation of due process unless an element of unfairness was
present. 0 Conversely, in a guilty plea to a capital offense, failure
to appoint counsel for an indigent defendant only partially literate
in English denies due process."
The issue has now become one of federal constitutional dimen-
sions, both in felonies" and in misdemeanors where incarceration
might occur.'3 Wisconsin's statutory right to counsel obliges ob-
3. State v. Froelich, 49 Wis. 2d 551, 182 N.W.2d 267 (1971).
4. State v. Bagnall, 61 Wis. 2d 297, 312, 212 N.W.2d 122 (1973) (Allowed withdrawal
on other grounds).
5. State ex rel. Casper v. Burke, 7 Wis. 2d 673, 97 N.W.2d 703 (1959).
6. Reiff v. State, 41 Wis. 2d 369, 164 N.W.2d 249 (1969).
7. Peterson v. State, 54 Wis. 2d 370, 195 N.W.2d 837 (1972).
8. Ailport v. State, 9 Wis. 2d 409, 100 N.W.2d 812 (1960) (Wilful and malicious setting
fire to land).
9. LaFave v. State, 233 Wis. 432, 289 N.W. 670 (1940) (Arson resulting from drunk's
setting fire to friend's home and record indicated possible accident).
10. State v. Turpin, 255 Wis. 358, 38 N.W.2d 495 (1949), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 936
(1950); in collateral proceedings after parole to New York and plea conviction there, federal
habeas corpus denial, 91 F. Supp. 47 (S.D. N.Y. 1950), affd sub nom, 190 F.2d 252 (2d
Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 872 (1951) (1945 pleas to larceny and unlawful use of
automobile).
I1. State ex rel. Drankovich v. Murphy, 248 Wis. 433, 22 N.W.2d 540 (1946) (First-
degree murder).
12. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 355 (1963).
13. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
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servance, 14 but the issue of lack of counsel must be preserved by
post-conviction motion in the trial court as a condition precedent
to raising it on appeal.15
The right to counsel may be voluntarily waived. 6 Where the
defendant has previously been exposed to the criminal process, his
experience imparts a greater confidence in the conclusion that he
comprehended the effects of the waiver. 17 An answer of "no," after
a judicial explanation of the right to counsel, is an abnegation of
such guaranty,1 8 especially when the defendant is no stranger to the
criminal courts." When the defendant answers, "no," seven times,
it should be clear he does not desire the assistance of counsel.2 1
While a twenty-five year old defendant with a high school educa-
tion and more than a year of college obviously has the intelligence
to accept or decline the services of counsel,2' a person of very low
intelligence, who has never been advised of his right to counsel, has
not surrendered this right as a matter of law.2 Accordingly, the
waiver of the right to counsel will be inquired into scrupulously; a
casual inquiry posed to a defendant with but a fifth grade education
and an IQ of seventy-five, charged with a capital crime, is simply
not enough .  As a general proposition, once ceded, the right to
counsel cannot be recovered. 24 On the other hand, where counsel
14. State ex rel. Doxtater v. Murphy, 248 Wis. 593, 22 N.W.2d 685 (1946) (Assault to
rape, I to 10 years); but see note 15 infra.
15. Van Voorhis v. State, 26 Wis. 2d 217, 131 N.W.2d 833 (1965).
16. Rafferty v. State, 29 Wis. 2d 470, 138 N.W.2d 741 (1966).
17. State ex rel. Wenzlaff v. Burke, 250 Wis. 525, 27 N.W.2d 475 (1947) (1939 plea
and sentence of I to 25 years for assault to rape, this being defendant's seventh felony, with
right to demand counsel well known to him); State ex rel. Casper v. Burke,,7 Wis. 2d 673,
97 N.W.2d 703 (1959) (Larceny from father by 50-year-old with prior prison record; 5
years); Van Voorhis v. State, 26 Wis. 2d 217, 131 N.W.2d 833 (1965) (2 counts of forgery
and 2 consecutive sentences; in 2 of 3 prior felonies, counsel was declined and defendant
admitted such in post-conviction proceedings); Drake v. State, 45 Wis. 2d 226, 172 N.W.2d
664 (1969) (Defendant had been in court eighteen times between 1947 and 1968).
18. State v. Pierce, 33 Wis. 2d 104, 146 N.W.2d 395 (1966).
19. Creighbaum v. State, 35 Wis. 2d 17, 150 N.W.2d 494 (1967), federal habeas corpus
denied, 287 F. Supp. 463 (E.D. Wis. 1967), affd 398 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 955 (1968), reh. denied, 393 U.S. 1046 (1968).
20. Reiff v. State, 41 Wis. 2d 369, 164 N.W.2d 249 (1969) (2 years for wife abandon-
ment amounting to felony nonsupport).
21. State ex rel. Stroetz v. Burke, 28 Wis. 2d 195, 136 N.W.2d 829 (1965) (Sodomy).
However, federal habeas corpus was granted in 1967 as to this 1954 plea on the issue that
there was no judicial advice as to the possible sentence.
22. State ex rel. Eastman v. Burke, 25 Wis. 2d 676, 131 N.W.2d 370 (1964) (1944 plea
to first-degree murder).
23. State ex rel. Burnett v. Burke, 22 Wis. 2d 486, 126 N.W.2d 91 (1964) (Charge was
first-degree murder).
24. State v. Mathis, 39 Wis. 2d 453, 159 N.W..2d 729 (1968). The dissent, that the
1975]
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appears at sentencing, his presence will relate back, operating as a
waiver of objection for lack of counsel.25
Appellate review in the area of right to counsel probes beyond
the stage of merely asserting',or waiving the right and can inquire
into the adequacy of the counsel furnished. Where a guilty plea has
been entered, the policy and factual questions facing an appellate
tribunal are not easily resolved. The right to counsel means vigor-
ous defense assistance. A plea of guilty may loom as the most
advantageous step. Simply because the defendant pleads guilty, no
presumption of professional incompetence should arise. 21 Such al-
legations most often erupt when the same attorney represents sev-
eral codefendants. In Wisconsin, as is generally true across the
nation, this fact creates no presumption of ineffective defense.
There must be a clear showing of absolute conflict of interest where
one is favored and the other sacrificed.2Y One who ultimately re-
ceives a lighter sentence than his codefendant is certainly in no
position to question the effectiveness of joint counsel's services. 21
Conversely, the fact that a codefendant happens to receive a lesser
sentence does not mean that the lawyer serving both is incompe-
tent.29 This is particularly true as to a recidivist who knows of a
possible conflict of interest, yet expressly requests that the same
counsel pursue the case to a conclusion."
On June 2, 1969, the United States Supreme Court invaded the
area of state court guilty pleas for the first time on a federal
constitutional basis in the now familiar case of Boykin v.
Alabama.31 While the essence thereof is that the plea be compre-
hended, voluntary, and indicative of true guilt, Boykin inquires
further into voluntariness by insisting that the defendant knowingly
surrender the right to trial, plus its ancillary guaranties of confron-
waiver did not continue through sentencing, 39 Wis. 2d at 460, 159 N.W.2d at 732, led to
granting of federal habeas corpus on that very ground, 307 F. Supp. 429 (E.D. Wis. 1969).
25. State v. Strickland, 27 Wis. 2d 623, 135 N.W.2d 295 (1965); Eskra v. State, 29 Wis.
2d 212, 138 N.W.2d 173 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 922 (1966).
26. Karlin v. State, 47 Wis. 2d 452, 177 N.W.2d 318 (1970) (Appointed counsel who
proved very effective in felony pleas to three burglary counts and using automobile without
owner's consent aggregating total sentence of four years created no such presumption
merely because counsel was part-time assistance city attorney).
27. Mueller v. State, 32 Wis. 2d 70, 145 N.W.2d 84 (1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 862
(1967).
28. State v. Reppin, 35 Wis. 2d 377, 151 N.W.2d 9 (1967).
29. Kaczmarek v. State, 38 Wis. 2d 71, 155 N.W.2d 813 (1968).
30. Curry v. State, 36 Wis. 2d 225, 152 N.W.2d 906 (1967) (Fourteen counts of bur-
glary, with sentences aggregating twenty-seven years).
31. 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
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tation and against compulsory self-incrimination.32 The rule is
universal, and Wisconsin formidably so states: Boykin is not retro-
active .3
Boykin did not mandate express, individualized waivers of the
rights it enunciated. It simply required a finding that the defendant
knew of his rights and chose to give them up and plead guilty. The
recidivist is a prime example of one equipped to make this
choice.3 Where the defendant was advised, at the outset, of his
Fifth Amendment rights by the police, the fact that the judge does
not spell out, in rote, the right against self-incrimination at the plea
does not affect validity of the conviction where the defendant never
claims he was unaware of this right:
It is not the litany to be recited that is most important. It is
rather that the record make clear that the plea of guilty was
voluntarily and understandingly entered.15
LANDMARK CASES
In three landmark cases, Wisconsin superseded the national
norm of constitutional issues, adopted the key American Bar Asso-
ciation Standards, but still retained the Wisconsin individuality as
concerns establishing a factual basis.
The first of the three cases is historical, for it was overruled by
theithird. The general procedural principle in this moribund philos-
ophy was that there was no judicial duty in a counselled guilty plea
to inquire whether the plea was voluntarily and intelligently en-
tered.31
In the second landmark case, State v. Reppin,37 the Wisconsin
court adopted ABA Standard 2.1 Relating to Gtlilty Pleas,
moulded it into an integral part of the common law of the state,
and gave it prospective effect where a defendant sought to with-
draw his guilty plea after sentence. The opinion reads as follows:
These standards adopt the "manifest injustice" test of Rule 32(d)
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and implements it
with four factual situations which the advisory committee be-
32. 395 U.S. at 243.
33. Ernst v. State, 43 Wis. 2d 661, 170 N.W.2d 713 (1969) (1964 guilty pleas to multiple
charges); Drake v. State, 45 Wis. 2d 226, 172 N.W.2d 664 (1969) (1968 plea).
34. Edwards v. State, 51 Wis. 2d 231, 186 N.W.2d 193 (1971).
35. Jones v. State, 59 Wis. 2d 184, 200, 207 N.W.2d 890, 898 (1973) (Fourteen years
for armed robbery, masked).
36. State v. Strickland, 27 Wis. 2d 623, 135 N.W.2d 295 (1965).
37. 35 Wis. 2d 377, 151 N.W.2d 9 (1967).
19751
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lieves independently establish manifest injustice when proved by
the defendant. We agree and adopt the standard. We think too
the four fact situations are not exhaustive of situations which
might constitute manifest injustice. And, a court would abuse its
discretion if it denied a request to withdraw a plea of guilty when
any one of these four grounds was proved. Reppin's contentions
fairly fall within the exemplified scope of the "manifest injustice"
rule. He argues he was denied effective assistance of counsel and
that his plea of guilty was involuntary in the sense it was not
intelligently made. True, the defendant has not alleged as a
ground for withdrawing his plea that he is innocent of the charge
to which the plea was entered, but such an allegation is not a
condition precedent to the granting of the motion if manifest
injustice is shown. The test at this stage is not whether the defen-
dant is guilty but whether he was fairly convicted."
Thus, Wisconsin established a prospectively mandatory procedure
regarding efforts to withdraw guilty pleas after sentence.
The third case, Ernst v. State,"9 established other procedural
standards to be mandatory after September 30, 1969.
In State ex rel. Burnett v. Burke (1964), 22 Wis. 2d 486, 494, 126
N.W.2d 91, 95-96, this court suggested that it was feasible for
the trial court to do the following and make a record thereof:
1. To determine the extent of the defendant's education and
general comprehension.
2. To establish the accused's understanding of the nature of the
crime with which he is charged and the range of punishment
which it carries.
3. To ascertain whether any promises or threats have been
made to him in connection with his appearance, his refusal of
counsel and his proposed plea of guilty.
4. To alert the accused to the possibility that a lawyer may
discover defenses or mitigating circumstances which would not
be apparent to a layman such as the accused.
5. To make sure that the defendant understands that if a pau-
per, counsel will be provided at no expense to him.
We are now of the opinion that the above precautionary stan-
dards must be implemented by the addition of a sixth standard.
The new standard provides that the trial judge should personally
determine 'that the conduct which the defendant admits consti-
tutes the offense charged in the indictment or information or an
38. State v. Reppin, 35 Wis. 2d 377, 386, 151 N.W.2d 9, 14 (1967).
39. Ernst v. State, 43 Wis. 661, 170 N.W.2d 713 (1969).
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offense included therein to which the defendant has pleaded
guilty.'
We are of the further opinion that the above procedure should
now be made mandatory for the following reasons: The first and
fourth standards are preliminary and elementary in nature; and
the second and third standards have been made applicable to the
states by the rulings in McCarthy and Boykin. Since Burnett,
standard five was made mandatory by sec. 957.26(1), Stats. The
additional standard referred to as No. 6 is mandatory under
McCarthy."
MECHANICS; ENTRY; EFFECT
The case establishing the basic modern Wisconsin plea me-
chanics preceded modern federal standards by five years and other
states by even more. That was State ex rel. Burnett v. Burke,"
decided in 1964. The guidelines were the first five standards quoted
above in the discussion of the Reppin case. While Burnett turned
on the issue of waiver of the right to counsel, its guidelines are now
solid law in Wisconsin.
There is no requirement of judicial advice as to each and every
element of the crime in pleas of guilty. 42 This is especially true
where the defendant already has a long history of similar crimes
and the record indicates his understanding is total.43 In this vein,
a fairly recent and sharply divided decision, which is open to seri-
ous doubt under the total facts and procedure, holds that the record
must show the defendant understood the crime and its elements.
The record did so show, and the defendant possessed the advantage
of a "thinking time" of eight months between the arraignment and
guilty plea. Even under these circumstances the conViction was
reversed in a four-three decision.44
Apart from prescribing positive duties for trial courts, the Wis-
consin court has specified certain advisory acts which judges are
not required to perform. The judge is not obligated to advise the
maximum possible sentence, 5 particularly as to a counselled defen-
40. Id. at 674, 170 N.W.2d at 719.
41. 22 Wis. 2d 486, 126 N.W.2d 91 (1964).
42. Bressette v. State, 54 Wis. 2d 232, 194 N.W.2d 635 (1972), (Such includes both the
principal charge and reductions therefrom).
43. Hanson v. State, 52 Wis. 2d 396, 190 N.W.2d 129 (1971) (Burglary; two and one
half years).
44. McAllister v. State, 54 Wis. 2d 224, 194 N.W.2d 639 (1972) (Shooting after drink-
ing bout, resulting in charge of injury by conduct regardless of life).
45. Creighbaum v. State, 35 Wis. 2d 17, 150 N.W.2d 494 (1967), federal habeas corpus
1975]
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dant when the record does not show he was ignorant thereof.4
There is no requisite that the judge tell the defendant that consecu-
tive sentences could occur, 47 and a guilty pleader who could have
been awarded a total of twenty-one years and only got three and
one-half sustains harmless error, if error at all, by absence of such
judicially related information.4 8 There is no Wisconsin mandate to
advise of collateral consequences, such as possible recidivist pro-
ceedings.49 Neither is the judge required to advise that presentence
bail might be denied and existing bail revoked."
There must be a factual basis in order for pleas of guilty to be
upheld on appeal in Wisconsin:
Where an accused waives counsel and pleads guilty, the trial
court should be certain the plea of guilty is not only voluntarily
but also understandingly made. The court should determine for
itself that there exists a factual basis for the plea.5
The factual basis can be supplied by post-conviction motion hear-
ing.5 2 Where intent is required and the defendant equivocates
thereto, the plea of guilty is nulla bona.5 1 Conversely, when the
defendant ratifies his prior confession at the "evidence stage" in
Wisconsin, he thereby supplies such factual basis.54 Also, intent can
be presumed from acts.55
Wisconsin's modern practice of furnishing a factual basis for
the valid plea of guilty is similar to the general practice with re-
spect to pleas of nolo contendere elsewhere across the nation.
Much of it is hearsay, with the tacit admission of the defendant
supplying ratification of such facts. The purpose of such hearsay
denied, 287 F. Supp. 463 (E.D. Wis. 1967), affd, 398 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 955 (1968), reh. denied, 393 U.S. 1046 (1968); LeFebre v. State, 40 Wis. 2d 666,
162 N.W.2d 544 (1968).
46. Vieau v. State, 39 Wis. 2d 162, 158 N.W.2d 367 (1968) (Burglary; five years).
47. Preston v. State, 58 Wis. 2d 728, 206 N.W.2d 619 (1973).
48. Burkhalter v. State, 52 Wis. 2d 413, 190 N.W.2d 502 (1971).
49. James v. State, 24 Wis. 2d 467, 129 N.W.2d 227 (1964) (Fraudulent transfer of
encumbered property, ten years, as to mature defendant who had already served Wisconsin
and Federal terms).
50. State v. McKnight, 65 Wis. 2d 582, 223 N.W.2d 550 (1974).
51. Galvin v. State, 40 Wis. 2d 677, 683, 162 N.W.2d 622, 624 (1968) (Nonsupport).
52. Loop v. State, 65 Wis. 2d 499, 222 N.W.2d 694 (1974).
53. State v. Stuart, 50 Wis. 2d 66, 183 N.W.2d 155 (1971) (Marine at home on leave
held knife to throat of long-haired graduate student, in pleading guilty to endangering safety
by conduct regardless of life, was never advised of right to counsel and denied, at sentencing,
any genuine intent to harm).
54. Christian v. State, 54 Wis. 2d 447, 195 N.W.2d 470 (1972).
55. Craker v. State, 66 Wis. 2d 222, 230, 223 N.W.2d 872 (1974).
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evidence is not that of proof, but rather support for the court's
determination that the defendant is guilty and that the evidence
constitutes the crime charged.56 Accordingly, the factual basis can
be furnished by police testimony.57 Where the evidence is over-
whelming, the fact that the defendant cannot recall the precise
moment of the crime does not preclude proper acceptance of the
guilty plea.1
A plea of guilty entered in open court by defense counsel, with
the defendant standing by present and silent, is bona fide, there
being no rule in Wisconsin that the defendant utter it personally.59
A fine summation of the effect of a guilty plea is stated in
Sorenson v. State," decided more than half a century ago:
In a criminal case, if a plea of guilty is understandingly en-
tered by a sane adult defendant, no further trial than the proper
pronouncement of a sentence is required. There is no issue to be
tried, no need for a jury, nor for the waiver of a jury trial either
orally or in writing, nor need the plea of guilty be in writing.6 -'
Correspondingly, the plea concedes the sufficiency of proofs, 1
thereby precluding prosecutorial showing of guilty beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.62 The plea also renders moot belated claims of de-
nial of trial and confrontation rights.63 The plea admits guilt and
waives the privilege against self-incrimination. 4 A long-standing
rule in Wisconsin is that a plea of guilty to several counts, with a
pardon later granted as to one, does not discharge the others on
which sentence was originally suspended.65
PRESUMPTIONS; NEGOTIATION; VALIDITY
A counselled, voluntary, understanding guilty plea is, ipso
56. Wilson v. State, 57 Wis. 2d 508, 204 N.W.2d 508 (1973) (Four years for burglary).
57. Edwards v. State, 51 Wis. 2d 231, 186 N.W.2d 193 (1971) (Masked robbery, eight
years); Martinkoski v. State, 51 Wis. 2d 237, 186 N.W.2d 302 (1971) (Burglary, seven
years).
58. State v. Herro, 53 Wis. 2d 211, 191 N.W.2d 889 (1971).
.59. Duenkel v. State, 207 Wis. 644, 242 N.W. 179 (1932) (Twenty years for rape).
60. 178 Wis. 197, 188 N.W. 622 (1922) (Assault with deadly weapon for robbery and
larceny of automobile, fifteen years).
60.1. 178 Wis. at 201, 188 N.W. 622, 623.
61. Rafferty v. State, 29 Wis. 2d 470, 138 N.W.2d 741 (1966).
62. Jacobs v. State, 50 Wis. 2d 355, 184 N.W.2d 110 (1971).
63. State ex rel Kline v. Burke, 27 Wis. 2d 40, 133 N.W.2d 405 (1965).
64. Hanneman v. State, 50 Wis. 2d 689, 184 N.W.2d 896 (1971) (Burglary, six years).
65. Barton v. State, 23 Wis. 587 (1869) (Check forgery).
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facto, valid. 6 Assuredly, where the Boykin" tests are met in a plea
entered after June 2, 1969, the conviction will be upheld. 8
A fulfilled plea bargain negates later allegations that the plea
was "induced," even though the judge does not follow the prosecu-
tor's recommendation of probation.69 While the judge may accept
a plea bargain, he should not be a negotiator, for at a post-plea
hearing he could not be both judge and witness." If the prosecutor
fulfills his "promise" but the independent probation officer has
opposite ideas, the conviction is still upheld.71 Negotiation brought
to fruition is more likely to be held binding when the sentence
offered and accepted actually results. 72 When other charges are
dropped as a part of the agreement, the completed negotiation will
be honored. 73 Plea bargains should be stated in the record. 74
Practicality sometimes necessitates a plea of guilty. A plea of
guilty offered to avoid a more severe sentence is the most practical
of all. Therefore, a guilty plea offered to escape such tougher
sentence is bona fide. 75
An intriguing aspect of the plea bargain process is the full
validity of accommodation pleas. 7 Here, the defendant offers his
plea in return for leniency or outright dismissal of charges as to a
66. Pillsbury v. State, 31 Wis. 2d 87, 142 N.W.2d 187 (1966). (Burglary, possession of
burglar tools, and perjury); Gibson v. State, 47 Wis. 2d 810, 177 N.W.2d 912 (1970); Martin
v. State, 48 Wis. 2d 604, 180 N.W.2d 552 (1970) (Aggravated battery, four and one half
years).
67. See notes 31 and 32 supra.
68. State v. Wolfe, 46 Wis. 2d 478, 175 N.W.2d 216 (1970).
69. Myartt v. State, 25 Wis. 2d 634, 131 N.W.2d 371 (1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
855 (1965) (Two to six years for possession and sale of marijuana).
70. Rahhal v. State, 52 Wis. 2d 144, 187 N.W.2d 800 (1971).
71. Farrar v. State, 52 Wis. 2d 651, 191 N.W.2d 214 (1971) (Two years for burglary;
the prosecutor delivered on his recommendation of one year, but the defendant learned in
advance of sentence that the probation officer - no party to the agreement - had urged no
less than two years).
72. Cresci v. State, 36 Wis. 2d 287, 152 N.W.2d 893 (1967).
73. Shavie v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 379, 182 N.W.2d 505 (1971) (Concurrent sentences of
two and three years for possession and sale of marijuana; defendant could have been
awarded up to ten and to twenty-five years, respectively); Austin v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 727,
183 N.W.2d 56 (1971) (Eight years for armed robbery; excellent analysis of policies among
the states dealing with nolle prosequi of other charges as part of the plea agreement).
74. State ex rel. White v. Gray, 57 Wis. 2d 17, 203 N.W.2d 638 (1973).
75. Mallon v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 185, 181 N.W.2d 364 (1970) (Armed robbery; female
bandit got twenty-five years, but could have received thirty; five other armed robbery
charges dismissed as part of negotiations); Salters v. State, 52 Wis. 2d 708, 191 N.W.2d 19
(1971) (Five years, avoided life sentence in tavern shooting); State v. Smith, 55 Wis. 2d 304,
198 N.W.2d 630 (1972) (Eighteen-year-old could have been recipient of total of forty-five
years, but got sixteen years in multiple charges involving factual situation of disarming,
handcuffing, and taking police car from deputy sheriffs).
76. Title designated by the writer. Some courts have labeled them as "sacrificial pleas;"
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loved one who is usually an accomplice in fact and, nearly always,
a codefendant in law. Such plea-based convictions, founded on
subjective reason, will be affirmed whether the defendant's protec-
tive wish is exercised for his wife77 or his brother.7"
WITHDRAWAL; COERCION; INDUCEMENT
Wisconsin's position on plea withdrawal before sentence is now
clearly announced. In Libke v. State,79 American Bar Association
Standard 2.1(b) 0 was adopted, proclaiming that "fair and just
reason" is required in presentence plea withdrawal. Libke involved
some interesting observations on behalf of the defendant. He op-
ined that things were happening "too darn fast" and that he "was
led down the wrong way with that lawyer." His conviction was
reversed and the Standard adopted.
Post-sentence plea retraction efforts plague the Wisconsin
courts just as they do the judiciaries of all the sister states. As is
true universally, the rule of reason proclaims allowance or denial
as a matter of discretion with the trial court and is reversible only
for an abuse of discretion." The step-by-step requirements have
been lucidly stated:
Thus, in order that he be entitled to withdraw his pleas of
guilty as a matter of right, the defendant must establish three
things: (1) That there occurred a violation of a relevant constitu-
tional right, (2) that this violation caused him to plead guilty, and
(3) that at the time of his guilty plea he was unaware of potential
constitutional challenges to the prosecution's case against him
because of that violation."
So much for the constitutional phase. The factual truth of guilt is
others as "Sir Galahad pleas."
77. Belcher v. State, 42 Wis. 2d 299, 166 N.W.2d 211 (1969) (Codefendant wife got
probation, while defendant received two consecutive twenty year sentences for armed rob-
bery and attempted murder); Drake v. State, 45 Wis. 2d 226, 172 N.W.2d 664 (1967) (Four
years for assisting escape; plea prevented wife from being charged as accomplice); Seybold
v. State, 61 Wis. 2d 227, 212 N.W.2d 146 (1973) (An "instant replay," sentence-wise, of
Belcher v. State, ante, involving jewelry store robbery).
78. State ex rel White v. Gray, 57 Wis. 2d 17, 203 N.W.2d 638 (1973), further proceed-
ings in 58 Wis. 2d 285, 206 N.W. 2d 163 (1973) (Burglary, eight years).
79. 60 Wis. 2d 121, 208 N.W.2d 331 (1973).
80. American Bar Association Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty.
81. De Vougas v. State, 29 Wis. 2d 489, 139 N.W.2d 17 (1966); Mueller v. State, 32
Wis. 2d 70, 145 N.W.2d 84 (1966) cert. denied, 389 U.S. 862 (1967); State v. Reppin, 35
Wis. 2d 377, 151 N.W.2d 9 (1967) (Robbery, five years); Rahhal v. State, 52 Wis. 2d 144,
187 N.W.2d 800 (1971) (Hot check, ten years).
82. State v. Carlson, 48 Wis. 2d 222, 230, 179 N.W.2d 851, 854 (1970) (Five years
for nine counts of burglary).
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stated in the following way, as concerns a post-conviction with-
drawal motion:
We here determine that if a motion to withdraw a guilty plea
after judgment and sentence alleges facts which, if true, would
entitle the defendant to relief, the trial court must hold an eviden-
tiary hearing. However, if the defendant fails to allege sufficient
facts in his motion to raise a question of fact, or presents only
conclusionary allegations, or if the record conclusively demon-
strates that the defendant is not entitled to relief, the trial court
may in the exercise of its legal discretion, deny the motion with-
out a hearing."
Plea withdrawal today is allowed only to correct manifest injus-
tice. 4
The basic reason plea secession is sought is unhappiness with
the sentence. Chief among such frustrated desires is an unsatisfied
hope of probation.85 Another is the dashed hope of an early pa-
role.86 Disappointment generally is no basis for plea withdrawal.
It follows, therefore, that failure to obtain the speculated sentence
is no ground for complaint. 8 Erroneous predictions as to sentence
by defense counsel supply no foundation for post-sentence plea
retraction. 9 A mistaken subjective belief that a plea bargain had
83. Nelson v. State, 54 Wis. 2d 489, 497, 195 N.W.2d 629, 633 (1972) (Manslaughter,
six years).
84. Morones v. State, 61 Wis. 2d 544, 556, 213 N.W.2d 31 (1973). (Attempted burglary,
three years).
85. Waddell v. State, 24 Wis. 2d 364, 129 N.W.2d 201 (1964) (Swindling, ten years.
Intriguing facts involving restaurant cook who engaged in food supplement business on the
side; his modus operandi was swindling women by making them think he would establish
them in retailing such supplements; at arraignment, judge admonished him not to have any
further contact with women prior to sentencing, but, at sentence, defendant admitted he had
contacted one of the complainants and had sexual relations with her during the interim);
State v. Wolfe, 46 Wis. 2d 478, 175 N.W.2d 216 (1970) (Two years for delivering LSD);
State v. Erickson, 53 Wis. 2d 474, 192 N.W.2d 872 (1972) (Two years for sale of heroin).
86. Kruse v. State, 47 Wis. 2d 460, 177 N.W.2d 322 (1970) (Fifteen years for second-
degree murder, plus two consecutive five-year sentences for two counts of aggravated bat-
tery; eligibility for parole proved to be four years instead of two).
87. Creighbaum v. State, 35 Wis. 2d 17, 150 N.W.2d 494 (1967), federal habeas corpus
denied, 287 F. Supp. 463 (E.D. Wis. 1967), affd, 398 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 955 (1968), reh. denied, 393 U.S. 1046 (1968) (Consecutive five-year terms for
burglary and aggravated battery).
88. State v. Froelich, 49 Wis. 2d 551, 182 N.W.2d 267 (1971) (1968 plea to armed
robbery and twenty-year sentence; defendant was hopeful plea bargain for two years would
be reached; it wasn't); Jacobs v. State, 50 Wis. 2d 355, 184 N.W.2d 110 (1971) (Twenty-
year maximum instead of dreamed of five in attempted murder and other charges); Craig
v. State, 55 Wis. 2d 489, 198 N.W.2d 609 (1972) (Armed robbery, thirty years; expectation
was only ten years).
89. Bressette v. State, 54 Wis. 2d 232, 194 N.W.2d 635 (1972) (Two armed robbery
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been reached is not enough either." Although a record of the
pretrial conference should be made, the lack of such, standing
alone, is not enough to set aside a plea-based conviction."
The belated assertion by a defendant that he "did not under-
stand the consequences" drew a withering reception:
To hold that the defendant here did not understand the possi-
ble penalties here. . . would be to assume the complete incom-
petence of trial counsel. A trial attorney is not a baby-sitter for
a defendant. He is a counsellor, advocate and adviser. This is the
sole justification for the tremendous cost to the public of court-
appointed counsel for indigent defendants in criminal trials.,'
A plea which is clearly coerced will be overturned. Compelling
the defendant to answer an incriminating question over objection
at the preliminary hearing, the plea coming two days later, is such
undue pressure." Conversely, where the record clearly refutes po-
lice duress, the conviction will be upheld. 4 Unless communicated
to the defendant, the fact that a lynch mob is forming does not bear
on plea validity. 5 Placing a pregnant seventeen-year-old defendant
in solitary confinement does not characterize a plea of guilty as
coerced when she is merged with the general jail population on her
eighteenth birthday, a month prior to her plea. Neither the prose-
cutor's threat of the maximum sentence at trial 7 nor the possibility
that a long sentence might occur98 constitute coercion.
Where the record rejects the contention, a belated averment
that the plea of guilty was induced by the prosecutor will not be
charges as to professional boxer who was also nightclub bouncer; two consecutive ten-year
sentences, while attorney's guess was concurrent terms).
90. Le Febre v. State, 40 Wis. 2d 666, 162 N.W.2d 544 (1968) (Burglary, five years);
Christian v. State, 54 Wis. 2d 447, 195 N.W.2d 470 (1972) (Twenty years for second-degree
murder).
91. State v. Harrell, 40 Wis. 2d 187, 161 N.W.2d 223 (1968) (Attempted rape, fifteen
years).
92. State v. Lingford, 43 Wis. 2d 615, 624, 169 N.W.2d 617, 621 (1969) (Indecent
behavior with child).
93. Brisk v. State, 44 Wis. 2d 584, 172 N.W.2d 199, 202 (1969) (Operating vehicle
without consent).
94. Meunier v. State, 46 Wis. 2d 271, 174 N.W.2d 277 (1970) (Defendant was hand-
cuffed in cell while damage thereto was being inspected; sheriff called defendant a "punk").
95. State ex rel. Burnett v. Burke, 22 Wis. 2d 486, 126 N.W.2d 91 (1969) (First-degree
murder; reversal was on lack of proper waiver of right to counsel).
96. State v. Herro, 53 Wis. 2d 211, 191 N.W.2d 889 (1971) (Twenty-five years for
second-degree murder).
97. Armstrong v. State, 55 Wis. 2d 282, 198 N.W.2d 357 (1972).
98. State v. Weidner, 47 Wis. 2d 321, 177 N.W.2d 69 (1970) (Two years for marijuana
possession; sentence could have been ten years).
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considered.99 On the other hand, where the trial court has not ruled
on the assertion that the prosecutor promised a sentence of three
years and then levies a sentence of five years, there will be a re-
mand for a finding on the issue.' Where the record repudiates
such, a later allegation that the plea was induced by defense coun-
sel will be granted no verity. 1'
WAIVERS; Nunc Pro Tunc DEFENSES
Waivers in Wisconsin pleas are broad and varied. The guilty
plea abandons all defenses and nonjurisdictional objections except
that the information charges no offense.' It abnegates irregulari-
ties in the complaint,03 and irregularities or defects in the infor-
mation."0 4 Abjured also are unlawful arrest,' or invalid arrest' 6
and illegal extradition.' 7 Ceded by the plea are the lack of a
Miranda warning by the police"5, or prosecutor,' and interroga-
tion without counsel." 0 Disclaimed are irregularities in confessions,
such as one obtained after the defendant was confined in a mental
99. Pulaski v. State, 23 Wis. 2d 138, 126 N.W.2d 625 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
862 (1964).
100. State v. Pierce, 33 Wis. 2d 104, 146 N.W.2d 395 (1966) (Forgery).
101. Luter v. State, 53 Wis. 2d 796, 193 N.W.2d 649 (1972) ("Leniency" via five-year
sentence was assertion; actual was ten years, inter alia); Hanes v. State, 55 Wis. 2d 72, 197
N.W.2d 802 (1972) (Twenty-five years for second-degree murder; defendant contended that
his lawyer had told him the charge would be reduced to manslaughter, with a one-year
sentence).
102. State v. Lampe, 26 Wis. 2d 646, 133 N.W.2d 349 (1965) (Forgery, five years),
overruling Spoo v. State, 219 Wis. 285, 262 N.W. 696 (1935), which had held that the plea
waives sufficiency of the information.
103. Burkhalter v. State, 52 Wis. 2d 413, 190 N.W.2d 502 (1971) (Theft and operating
vehicle without consent, plus six months consecutive for escape; there was merely typo-
graphical error in complaint).
104. State v. Strickland, 27 Wis. 2d 623, 135 N.W.2d 295 (1965); State v. Bagnall, 61
Wis. 2d 297, 212 N.W.2d 122 (1973) (Thirty years for attempted murder of policeman).
105. Hawkins v. State, 26 Wis. 2d 443, 132 N.W.2d 545 (1965) (No warrant); Carter
v. State, 27 Wis. 2d 451, 134 N.W.2d 444 (1965), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 867 (1967) (Armed
robbery, twenty-five years).
106. State v. Biastock, 42 Wis. 2d 525, 167 N.W.2d 231 (1969).
107. Belcher v. State, 42 Wis. 2d 299, 166 N.W.2d 211 (1969) (Extradition had been
waived at the outset).
108. Smith v. State, 60 Wis. 2d 373, 210 N.W.2d 678 (1973).
109. State v. Draper, 41 Wis. 2d 747, 165 N.W.2d 165 (1969) (Police had previously
supplied the warning before prosecutorial interrogation).
110. State ex rel. Kline v. Burke, 27 Wis. 2d 40, 133 N.W.2d 405 (1965) (1956 armed
robbery plea, fifteen years; defendant also supplied signed statement); State v. Mathis, 39
Wis. 2d 453, 159 N.W.2d 729 (1968), federal habeas corpus granted, other grounds, 307 F.
Supp. 420 (E.D. Wis. 1969).
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institution five years"' or one given from remorse.12 A confession
given at the morgue, where the defendant has been taken to iden-
tify the body of deceased is not coerced and is superseded by a later
guilty plea."' Supposedly coerced' 4 or illegal" 5 confessions are
disowned by later guilty pleas.
A plea of guilty renounces an objection to a lineup the defen-
dant afterward thinks was illegal"' or improper." 7 It forfeits a
supposed illegal search and seizure" 8 and arraignment delay (un-
lawful detention)."' Pre-plea delay of appointment of counsel is
immolated, too, by the plea.' Various aspects of the preliminary
hearing are relinquished by ensuring guilty pleas, including delay
in the hearing,' 21 irregularities therein,'2 as well as denial of the
hearing itself.23 Denials of pretrial bail reduction tu and of pretrial
motions, such as for a separate trial's are surrendered when the
111. McLaughlin v. State, 32 Wis. 2d 124, 145 N.W.2d 153 (1966), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 862 (1967) (First-degree murder).
112. Crummel v. State, 46 Wis. 2d 348, 174 N.W.2d 517 (1970) (Confession to sexual
perversion and aggravated battery upon fourteen-year-old boy was freely given).
113. Griffin v. State, 43 Wis. 2d 385, 168 N.W.2d 571 (1969).
114. Krueger v. State, 53 Wis. 2d 345, 192 N.W.2d 880 (1972) (1965 burglary plea, ten
years); Smith v. State, 60 Wis. 2d 373, 210 N.W.2d 678 (1973).
115. Pontow v. State, 58 Wis. 2d 135, 205 N.W.2d 775 (1973) (Burglary, ten years).
116. State v. Biastock, 42 Wis. 2d 525, 167 N.W.2d 231 (1969).
117. Smith v. State, 60 Wis. 2d 373, 210 N.W.2d 678 (1973).
118. Hawkins v. State, 26 Wis. 2d 443, 132 N.W.2d 545 (1965) (Two to ten years for
possession and use of heroin and possession of marijuana; very well documented case, listing
many federal authorities); Eskra v. State, 29 Wis. 2d 212, 138 N.W.2d 173 (1965), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 922 (1966) (Burglary and theft of TV sets, five years); State v. Mathis, 39
Wis. 2d 453, 159 N.W.2d 729 (1968), federal habeas corpus granted, other grounds, 307
F.Supp. 429 (E.D. Wis. 1969) (Three counts of burglary); State v. Biastock, 42 Wis. 2d 525,
167 N.W.2d 231 (1969) (Two counts of armed robbery, with consecutive three-year sent-
ences); Meunier v. State, 46 Wis. 2d 271, 174 N.W.2d 277 (1970) (Burglary, five years).
119. Pulaski v. State, 23 Wis. 2d 138, 126 N.W.2d 625 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
862 (1964) (Three counts of burglary, eight years; allegation of being held incommunicado
thirty-six hours); Rafferty v. State, 29 Wis. 2d 470, 138 N.W.2d 741 (1966) (Ten years for
armed robbery; belated averment was detention of forty hours); Cresci v. State, 36 Wis. 2d
287, 152 N.W.2d 893 (1967) (Armed robberty, ten years; detention was forty-two hours).
120. Kaczmarek v. State, 38 Wis. 2d 71, 155 N.W.2d 813 (1968) (Four years for
burglary; delay was ten days).
121. Godard v. State, 55 Wis. 2d 189, 197 N.W.2d 811 (1972) (Eight years for two
counts of check forgery, remanded for sentence clarification; preliminary was delayed more
than a year, including several adjournments).
122. Crummel v. State, 46 Wis. 2d 348, 174 N.W.2d 517 (1970).
123. State v. Strickland, 27 Wis. 2d 623, 135 N.W.2d 295 (1965); Belcher v. State, 42
Wis. 2d 299, 166 N.W.2d 211 (1969).
124. Belcher v. State, 42 Wis. 2d 299, 166 N.W.2d 211 (1969) (Bail was $25,000 on
robbery charge and $50,000 on attempted murder charge).
125. Id.
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defendant pleads guilty. Correspondingly, the lack of pretrial mo-
tions altogether is sacrificed by the subsequent plea." 6
Venue objections, being nonjurisdictional, are waived by a plea
of guilty.'2
Matters of counsel enter the picture of waivers as well. Thus,
insufficient time to confer with counsel is renounced by the plea
of guilty when the over-all record portrays the plea to be under-
standing and voluntary.'2 Where an appointed lawyer has cor-
rectly advised the defendant as to the law and possible defenses,
the plea of guilty forfeits a refusal to appoint new counsel merely
because of the defendant's "incompatability with counsel. 129
Objections grounded in the fact that the defendant was not present
at an in-chambers pretrial conference are relinquished by a volun-
tary guilty plea accepted thereafter.'
All defenses are surrendered by a plea of guilty, including lack
of intent 3' and self-defense.12 Constitutional defenses such as
double jeopardy are also effaced by a voluntary guilty plea,'33 as
one unusual tavern shooting homicide case illustrates. Therein,
after a first-degree murder charge, the court allowed the prosecu-
tor's motion to reduce the charge, the 1968 plea ensuing. During
the police testimony as to the factual basis, the judge had misgiv-
ings as to the reduction. A motion to reinstate the original charge
126. Quinn v. State, 53 Wis. 2d 821, 193 N.W.2d 665 (1972) (Eight and four years,
concurrently for armed robbery and aggravated battery; filing such motions are not required
as a test of competency of counsel).
127. Dowling v. State, 205 Wis. 314, 237 N.W. 98 (1931) (Receiving earnings of prosti-
tute); Dolan v. State, 48 Wis. 2d 696, 180 N.W.2d 623 (Escape, two years).
128. State v. Willing, 39 Wis. 2d 408, 159 N.W.2d 15 (1968) (Felony theft, three years
probation, of which ninety days were to be spent in jail at night; counsel was retained by
eighteen-year-old, who later alleged only five to ten minutes conference time); Ernst v.
State, 43 Wis. 2d 661, 170 N.W.2d 713 (1969) (Eight-year sentence in 1964 pleas to seven
counts of burglary, plus attempted burglary, carrying concealed weapon, and reckless driv-
ing; defendant contended he only had five minutes with counsel).
129. Peters v. State, 50 Wis. 2d 682, 184 N.W.2d 826 (1971).
130. Kruse v. State, 47 Wis. 2d 460, 177 N.W.2d 322 (1970).
131. Preston v. State, 58 Wis. 2d 728, 206 N.W.2d 619 (1973) (Twenty years for
attempted murder).
132. Griffin v. State, 43 Wis. 2d 385, 168 N.W.2d 571 (1969) (Manslaughter, eight
years).
133. Hawkins v. State, 30 Wis. 2d 264, 140 N.W.2d 226 (1966) (Seventeen hot check
charges where defendant pled guilty on first three, then requested the other fourteen be
consolidated and entered guilty plea to all seventeen; four years, total); Nelson v. State, 53
Wis. 2d 769, 193 N.W.2d 704 (1972) (Burglary, eight years, and heroin use, five years
concurrent; where latter charge was dismissed ro that defendant could apply for federal
narcotics center but is rejected, second plea waives double jeopardy); Smith v. State, 60 Wis.
2d 373, 210 N.W.2d 678 (1973).
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was granted and the judge disqualified himself. Although the origi-
nal plea had been accepted, a motion to dismiss the reinstated
count was heard and denied. In 1969, the prosecutor again reduced
the charge, a second plea was accepted, and sentence followed. The
court observed that:
In order for there to be validity to the assertion of double
jeopardy there would have to have been a judgment of acquittal
or a dismissal of the charges and then a second prosecution-on
the basis of the same offense.'
Correspondingly, all constitutional violations are disavowed by a
valid plea of guilty:
[ . . T]his court has 'consistently held that claims of constitu-
tional violations, if nonjurisdictional, may be waived by a plea
of guilty intelligently and voluntarily entered."35
Mere technical, clerical errors in the record are ceded by a plea
of guilty. 36
Nunc pro tunc defenses never suffice to vacate pleas of guilty.
Included among them are afterthought, insanity,'37 near hysteria
at the time of the plea, 38 inability to speak English (where police
read defendant his rights in his native language),139 intoxication,'
drug addiction "' or narcotism,"' medication in jail,"' and long
delayed assertion of lack of intent.'
134. Salters v. State, 52 Wis. 2d 708, 715, 191 N.W.2d 19, 22 (1971).
135. Smith v. State, 60 Wis. 2d 373, 380, 210 N.W.2d 678, 682 (1973) (Eighteen years
on first count of armed robbery; fifteen years, consecutive, on second, but via "banishment
probation"-stay out of Wisconsin).
136. Peterson v. State, 54 Wis. 2d 370, 195 N.W.2d 837 (1972) (Multiple forgery counts,
plus other charges).
137. Sorenson v. State, 178 Wis. 197, 188 N.W. 622 (1922).
138. Luter v. State, 53 Wis. 2d 796, 193 N.W.2d 649 (1972) (Two counts of armed
robbery, operating vehicle without consent, and sodomy in jail).
139. Ernst v. State, 181 Wis. 155, 193 N.W. 978 (1923).
140. State v. Guiden, 46 Wis. 2d 328, 174 N.W.2d 488 (1970) (Burglary); Peters v.
State, 50 Wis. 2d 682, 184 N.W.2d 826 (1971) (Burglary).
141. De Vougas v. State, 29 Wis. 2d 489, 139 N.W.2d 17 (1966) (Three counts of forging
narcotics prescriptions, consecutive sentences of one and two thirds, one and two thirds, and
one years).
142. State v. Bruesewitz, 57 Wis. 2d 475, 204 N.W.2d 514 (1973).
143. State v. Koerner, 32 Wis. 2d 60, 145 N.W.2d 157 (1966) (Armed burglary and
other charges; demerol and pain pills administered in jail for wounds received at crime
shoot-out).
144. State v. Chabonian, 55 Wis. 2d 723, 201 N.W.2d 25 (1972) (1967 burglary plea
where defendant drove getaway car and evidence of guilt was overwhelming).
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SENTENCING; APPELLATE PRACTICE; MISDEMEANORS
Absence of counsel at the crucial stage of sentencing causes a
remand for sentencing with counsel present.145 Use of the defen-
dant's juvenile record when assessing sentence is perfectly pro-
per,"" and allowance or denial of access of the defendant or his
counsel to the contents of a presentence report is discretionary. 4 '
While equity exists in many areas of the law, there is no equity in
sentencing as among co-defendants. 48
On appeal, if no merit has been found by two successive ap-
pointed counsel, the defendant is not entitled to a third appointed
counsel to seek appellate review.' On some occasions the defen-
dant does quite ably enough by himself, even drawing favorable
commentary from the judiciary on his scientific-like post-
conviction efforts.' There is a condition precedent to appeal of a
guilty plea in Wisconsin:
A claim that defendant was not properly advised cannot be
raised as a matter of right of the judgment unless the claim was
raised in the trial court before judgment.'
In earlier days, the mere fact that a plea of guilty to a misde-
meanor was entered without counsel had no bearing on validity,8 2
for where the sentence did not exceed six months, there was no
obligation to furnish counsel.' It would seem that this policy has
now been superseded by a more recent decision of the United
States Supreme Court.'54 Wisconsin had previously determined
that although the charges were misdemeanors, a denial of counsel
145. State v. Strickland, 27 Wis. 2d 623, 135 N.W.2d 295 (1965).
146. McKnight v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 623, 182 N.W.2d 291 (1971) (Armed robbery, seven
years).
147. Waddell v. State, 24 Wis. 2d 364, 129 N.W.2d 201 (1964).
148. Armstrong v. State, 55 Wis. 2d 282, 198 N.W.2d 357 (1972) (Six years for bur-
glary; codefendant got four years).
149. McLaughlin v. State, 32 Wis. 2d 124, 145 N.W.2d 153 (1966), cer. denied, 389
U.S. 862 (1967) (This strange murder case commenced by 1959 indictment, but examination
showed defendant too feeble-minded to stand trial, and first appointed lawyer died before
defendant recovered competence in 1964, when second counsel appointed and saw no viable
reason to seek plea withdrawal, two successive subsequently appointed counsels finding no
error, either),
150. State ex rel. Kline v. Burke, 27 Wis. 2d 40, 133 N.W.2d 405 (1965).
151. Van Voorhis v. State, 26 Wis. 2d 217, 223, 131 N.W.2d 833, 836 (1965).
152. Bartozek v. State, 186 Wis. 644, 203 N.W. 374 (1925) (Two months plus $300 for
illegally manufacturing, transporting, and possessing liquor for sale).
153. State v. Draper, 41 Wis. 2d 747, 165 N.W.2d 165 (1969) (Six months for reckless
use of weapon).
154. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
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where indigence was shown would violate due process155 if the de-
fendant faced a substantial sentence.
As was true in felony cases, withdrawal efforts of misdemeanor
pleas after sentence which are grounded solely on disappointment
in sentence are to no avail.5 ' Irregularities in the arrest warrant
are waived by the guilty plea.
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
Earlier, there was federal agreement with the earlier state pol-
icy that, for want of benefit of counsel, an ingredient of unfairness
must have actively operated in the process that resulted in confine-
ment. 57 While the right to counsel can be understandingly
waived,"'8 such waiver may sometimes be suspect 5' and require
prosecutorial proof that it was intelligently made.' Constitutional
prerequisites in pleas of guilty announced by the Supreme Court
of the United States June 2, 1969,81 are prospective only."2 The
federal courts back up Wisconsin's presumption doctrine, too:
In . . . Wisconsin, the appointment of competent defense
counsel . . . gives rise to a presumption that the defendant has
been informed of the nature of the offense with which he is
charged, the range of punishment, the possible defenses, and that
he has understandingly considered these factors with the help of
counsel. Such a presumption can be overcome only by a clear
showing to the contrary."'
155. State ex rel Barth v. Burke, 24 Wis. 2d 82, 128 N.W.2d 422 (1964) (Nineteen
misdemeanor charges; lack of counsel caused reversal of five consecutive one-year sent-
ences).
156. Foster v. State, 160 Wis. 252, 151 N.W. 264 (1915) (Six months for gambling;
defendant expected only a fine); Gordon v. State, 178 Wis. 205, 188 N.W. 752 (1922) (Six
months for receiving one stolen auto tire, a fine being the erroneous hope).
157. United States ex rel. Turpin v. Warden of Green Haven Prison, 190 F.2d 252 (2d
Cir. 1951, interpreting Wisconsin law), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 872 (1951). For state proceed-
ings that went before, see note 10 supra.
158. Horwath v. Burke, 236 F.Supp. 674 (E.D. Wis. 1965).
159. Witte v. Burke, 281 F.Supp. 300 (W.D. Wis. 1968) (In 1956 incest plea, where
forty-six-year-old defendant with eighth grade education was not fully apprised of conse-
quences under sex deviate law, waiver of right to counsel was dubious as to sufficiency).
160. Des Bouillons v. Burke, 418 F.2d 297 (7th Cir. 1969) (Aggregate of fifteen years
in several 1945 pleas, with new aggregate of sixty-five years in multiple 1947 pleas),
reversing Des Bouillons v. Burke, 287 F.Supp. 140 (W.D. Wis. 1968).
161. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
162. Monsour v. Cady, 342 F.Supp. 353 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (Multiple pleas entered May
12, 1969).
163. Burbey v. Burke, 295 F.Supp. 1045, 1048 (E.D. Wis. 1969).
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Accordingly, a counselled, understanding state guilty plea passes
federal muster. 6'
The practicalities of state court plea negotiation have gained
observant federal commentary:
When a defendant in a criminal prosecution engages in plea
bargaining, he faces a set of unpleasant alternatives, particularly
when the prosecutor does not go so far as to recommend proba-
tion. But unpleasantness is not in and of itself coercive.'
Allowance or denial of plea retraction before sentence is purely
a matter of judicial discretion.'66 Unhappiness, either with the
length of the sentence 6 ' or with the place of confinement, 6 8 will not
justify plea withdrawal after sentence. Standing alone, a mere alle-
gation of innocence is not enough to overturn a valid "plea bar-
gain.' 6 9
The inducement issue has been a troublesome one in Wisconsin
federal habeas corpus. A hearing is required where the allegation
is that concurrent rather than consecutive sentences had been rep-
resented by defense counsel but consecutive sentences were given. 70
Waivers are as equally vast on federal review as they are on
appeal in Wisconsin courts and include lack of counsel at time of
arrest and during interrogation,17 1 an "illegal lineup and mug
shots,"' a confession without counsel,7 3 an "illegal" confes-
164. Ostrowski v. Burke, 402 F.2d 377 (7th Cir. 1968) (Twenty years for third-degree
murder); Hawpetoss v. Burke, 296 F.Supp. 1199 (E.D. Wis. 1969) (Manslaughter, twelve
years).
165. Monsour v. Cady, 342 F.Supp. 353, 357 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (Five years for aggra-
vated battery and a consecutive year for eleven various narcotics violations).
166. Mathis v. Burke, 307 F.Supp. 429 (E.D. Wis. 1969) (Burglary).
167. Stoeckle v. Burke, 241 F.Supp. 157 (E.D. Wis. 1965) (Theft, five years; defendant
hoped for minimum and got maximum).
168. United States ex rel. O'Neill v. Burke, 379 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 876 (1967) (Eleven counts of burglary; defendant wanted psychiatric treatment in
a hospital instead of incarceration in penitentiary).
169. Hansen v. Mathews, 296 F.Supp. 1328 (E.D. Wis. 1969), affd, 424 F.2d 1205 (7th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1057 (1970) (1961 plea to endangering safety by conduct
regardless of life, five years, with recidivist charge dropped; defendant tried to run down
policeman while driving car not his own).
170. Schmitt v. Burke, 277 F.Supp. 809 (E.D. Wis. 1967) (Attempted escape).
171. Kleinhans v. Cady, 314 F.Supp. 1276 (W.D. Wis. 1970) (Unspecified sex crime).
172. Holmes v. Gagnon, 324 F.Supp. 180 (E.D. Wis. 1971) (Armed robbery, five years);
on later inspection, federal habeas corpus was granted, 339 F.Supp. 1010 (E.D. Wis. 1972),
when it was uncontroverted that defense counsel urged the defendant to "lie to the court in
order to go along with the deal."
173. United States ex rel. O'Neill v. Burke, 379 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 876 (1967).
[Vol. 58
GUILTY PLEAS IN WISCONSIN
sion,'74 a "coerced" confession,"' arraignment delay ("illegal" de-
tention),176 no counsel at preliminary hearing 77 or, for that matter,
no preliminary hearing at all.178 Late filing of the information is a
matter which is abjured by a still later plea of guilty. 7'
Where the defendant does not have counsel at sentencing, fed-
eral habeas corpus will be granted.18 0 It will be denied, however,
as a matter deemed waived simply because the defendant has to
wait seven months to receive a copy of the plea transcript in order
to seek a state court appeal."81
SUMMARY
Wisconsin is not too favorable a forum for defendants who
plead guilty and then seek appellate or post-conviction absolution,
by whatever route or routes available. The case tabulation portrays
the statistical results.
Federal
State Cases Habeas Corpus Total %
Aff'd Rv Total Aff'd Rv Total Aff'd Rv Total Aff'd
Wisconsin 102 12 115 18 4 22 120 17 137 88.3
The chronological history is equally interesting, in the refine-
ment of the raw figures of statistics. Wisconsin's first reversal of a
felony plea did not take place until 1940, and there was only one
other, in 1946, until the decade of the 1960's. Its lone misdemeanor
reversal came in 1964.
The impact of the advent of the United States Supreme Court
174. Schwensow v. Burke, 252 F.Supp. 336 (E.D. Wis. 1966) (Burglary and operating
auto without consent, ten years).
175. Kleinhans v. Cady, 314 F.Supp. 1276 (W.D. Wis. 1970).
176. United States ex rel. O'Neill v. Burke, 379 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 876 (1967) (One week); Kline v. Burke, 239 F.Supp. 798 (E.D. Wis. 1965).
177. Kline v. Burke, 239 F.Supp. 798 (E.D. Wis. 1965) (Armed robbery, fifteen years).
178. Butler v. Burke, 360 F.2d 118 (7th Cir. 1966), cerl. denied, 385 U.S. 835 (1966)
(Entice child for criminal purposes; defendant formally waived the preliminary in advance);
Peters v. Burke, 279 F.Supp. 770 (E.D. Wis. 1968) (1958 pleas to robbery, aggravated
battery and rape); Burbey v. Burke, 295 F.Supp. 1045 (E.D. Wis. 1969) (Attempt to entice
child for immoral purposes; no constitutional right to preliminary hearing).
179. United States ex rel. O'Neill v. Burke, 379 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 876 (1967) (Information filed same day as plea).
180. Mathis v. Burke, 307 F.Supp. 429 (E.D. Wis. 1969).
181. Seybold v. Cady, 431 F.2d 683 (7th Cir. 1970) (Two consecutive twenty-year
sentences for armed robbery and attempted murder).
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into state guilty plea procedure in 1969, coupled with promulgation
of the American Bar Association Standards Relating to Pleas of
Guilty, was both received and acted upon vigorously by Wisconsin
in landmark cases. In essence, plea acceptance is governed by the
ABA Standards. Withdrawal is basically governed in Wisconsin by
these same ABA Standards. Over the years, there still seem to be
localized policies of stability in pleas of guilty. In Wisconsin, the
factual basis still appears to be testimony, even though ex parte or
from outside sources, as in a nolo contendere plea, instead of direct
judicial confessions by defendants.
There is no absolute way to achieve perfection. There is no way
to constitutionally prevent some type of post-conviction protest of
sentence by a defendant who has entered a plea of guilty based on
genuine lack of innocence and has done so understandingly, volun-
tarily, and with benefit of counsel. Improvement is needed, how-
ever, and some deterrent is definitely in order to unclog the judicial
docket logjam existing in the trial and appellate courts.
One of the best ways to alleviate the post-conviction burden in
the trial courts and the even more onerous appellate load is to
assure propriety of the plea procedure record. It is far safer to
over-advise a defendant than to under-advise him. Accordingly, a
proposed "guidebook" is annexed as an appendix.
The factual basis has caused many plea headaches in many
jurisdictions. In open court, and especially where codefendants are
involved, it is frequently difficult to extract a truthful judicial con-
fession from one seeking to plead guilty. Accordingly, it is submit-
ted that a written factual stipulation supplant a verbal admission,
subject to the judicial inquiry as to the truth thereof and incorpora-
tion in the record.
If the plea record is proper, appeals will most often be frivo-
lous. Though California defendants have evaded its provisions by
other routes, notably the generally outmoded coram nobis, few
have successfully challenged their guilty plea convictions. It is sub-
mitted that the California conditions precedent to plea appeals
merit serious consideration and adoption throughout the nation.
The California statute reads as follows:
No appeal shall be taken by defendant from a judgment of con-
viction upon a plea of guilty . . . except where:
(a) The defendant has filed with the trial court a written
statement, executed under oath or penalty of perjury showing
reasonable constitutional, jurisdictional, or other grounds going
to the legality of the proceedings; and
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(b) The trial court has executed and filed a certificate of
probable cause for such appeal with the county clerk.112
A mandatory condition precedent to appellate review should be
denial of a motion to vacate the plea in the trial court, and this
should occur before judgment if formally entered in the record.
Thus, it is proposed that guilty pleas be a three-stage procedure:
(a) plea, then, after appropriate time lag, (b) pronouncement of
sentence, and, after another time lag, (c) formal entry of judgment.
There is no plausible reason why withdrawal efforts cannot-or
should not-be brought before the final stage.
182. WEST'S ANN. PENAL CODE CALIF., § 1237.5.
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APPENDIX
GUIDEBOOK IN GUILTY PLEAS
No plea of guilty, especially to a felony, should be accepted unless at least
ten (10) days have elapsed after appearance of counsel, or a sworn waiver of
counsel following a detailed examination by the judge as to why counsel is de-
clined. Similarly, whether the defendant has a lawyer or not, there is still no
substitute for the judge's signature on a legal document to impress upon the
defendant the fact that, regardless of his crime, he is in an American court
where fair play rules above all. With such direct communication with the judge
himself, regardless of the intervention of counsel, few, if any, defendants would
be likely to feel "railroaded."
In this vein, it is strongly urged that certain "paperwork" formalities be
observed. When counsel for the defense (or the defendant pro se, if he stubbornly
refuses counsel) has notified the judge that the defendant intends to plead guilty
to some charge-either the principal one or a reduction thereof, or with others to
be dismissed or nolle prosequi entered thereto-the judge should supply two
forms shortly thereafter (one week is the suggested time). These are: (1) Judicial
Advice to Defendant and (2) Defendant's Response to Court. Both should be
receipted and entered on the record accordingly. The first might well take the
form of the following and should be signed personally by the judge, with the case
captions and summary of the indictment or information preceding the caption:
JUDICIAL ADVICE TO DEFENDANT
(I) You are charged with committing the crime of as
related by the attached indictment/informmation.
(2) The Court has learned that you wish to plead guilty to
(3) The minimum sentence for the offense to which you have indicated
you wish to plead guilty is
(4) The maximum sentence for the offense to which you have indicated
you wish to plead guilty is
(5) Regardless of your indicated desire to plead guilty, you have a right
to trial before a jury of impartial citizens, and to have your lawyer present
throughout such trial.
(6) In the event you wish a trial, you could, also, have such before the judge
alone and without a jury if you prefer. If you do, so indicate in writing.
(7) In either situation, if you want a trial, you would be presumed innocent
of all crimes, and the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
you are guilty of the crime to which you now desire to enter a guilty plea.
(8) If you had a trial, every defense you might have could be introduced
in your favor, no matter what the defense might be.
(9) If you had a trial, you could require every witness favorable to your
defense to be present and testify, and the court would compel them to be here
and testify for you.
(10) If you had a trial, you would be able to confront all witnesses against
you, face-to-face, and have your lawyer cross-examine them to be sure they
are telling the truth.
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(11) If you had a trial, you would not have to testify unless you wanted to,
nor could anything you have ever done be admitted in evidence against you if
you did not testify. If you want to remain silent, that is your privilege at the
trial, and nobody could comment about such silence.
(12) Your offer to plead guilty will not be accepted unless you honestly
feel you are guilty of the crime to which you are offering to plead guilty.
(13) Your offer to plead guilty will not be accepted if you are doing so
because you are afriad of anything or anybody, or because of any threats any-
body may have made to you, directly or indirectly.
(14) Your offer to plead guilty will not be accepted if you are doing so
only because somebody promised you probation, a suspended sentence, or a
light sentence, for nobody has any authority whatever to make such a promise.
(15) Your offer to plead guilty will not be accepted if you do not believe
now you are fully sane and in total control of your mental ability and able to
understand what is taking place.
(16) If you plead guilty, you surrender any right now or later on to chal-
lenge anything that took place before your plea of guilty is accepted.
(17) If you plead guilty, you give up your right to trial and your defenses,
and you will not get to confront witnesses against you, for by such plea of
guilty you will incriminate yourself, and the prosecution will not have to prove
anything at all.
(18) If you plead guilty, by your stipulation of facts, you will be confessing
under oath that you committed the crime to which you are pleading guilty.
(19) The elements of the crime to which you have indicated you wish to
plead guilty are
(20) Your lawyer will inspect, with you, your response to the court's advice
to you, and will help you in answering it, which must be completed under oath.
That means that, if you swear to what you say in your Response and do not
tell the truth, you could be punished for perjury.
Judge
Within a reasonable time-fifteen days is a suggested maximum-the
defendant should acknowledge receipt of Judicial Advice and complete, on
oath, and, with advice of counsel, his response thereto. Upon the court's receipt
thereof, the plea offer should be docketed-and heard-within five days. The
response could well take the following form.
19751
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DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO COURT
(1) Do you understand everything stated to you in Judicial Advice to
Defendant?
(2) If there is anything about Judicial Advice you do not understand, what
is it?.
(3) State your age , how far you went in school,
and your marital status
(4) Do you want a trial by jury?
(5) Do you want a trial without a jury?
(6) Do you understand all of your constitutional rights?
If not, what do you not understand?
(7) If you have any questions about the legal elements of the crime to
which you wish to plead guilty, what are they?
(8) Do you fully understand the maximum and minimum sentence limits
you might have to serve if your guilty plea is accepted?
What are they?
(9) Are you now fully sane and aware of what you are doing and the pos-
sible consequences?
(10) If you committed the crime to which you seek to plead guilty, were you
fully sane and aware of what you did then? _. If not, explain:
(11) Has anybody or anything forced you to plead guilty?
If so, who or what?
(12) Has anybody promised you a suspended sentence, probation, or a light
sentence if you plead guilty? . If so, who?
What did they promise?
(13) Do you fully realize that, by your offer to plead guilty, you surrender
the right to challenge everything that happened before you offered to plead
guilty?
(14) Do you fully realize that, by your guilty plea, you give up the right to
trial and all your other constitutional rights in connection with this case?
(15) Do you fully realize that when you complete your stipulation of facts
under oath, you are confessing that you are truly guilty of committing the crime
to which you plead guilty (or a higher crime) and by doing so, this is as much a
conviction as if a jury found you guilty?
(16) Do you fully realize that by such sworn stipulation of facts that, if
you do so falsely, you can and will be prosecuted for perjury (false swearing) and
be punished for such over and above the crime to which you are pleading
guilty?
(17) Are there any circumstances, facts, or events concerning your case
that you wish to tell the court before your offer to plead guilty?
If so, what are they?
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(18) Were you on probation or parole from any state or the federal gov-
ernment when you committed the crime to which you wish to plead guilty, if you
did commit it? . If so, where, when, and commencing when and
for how long?
(19) Do you fully realize that, if your guilty plea is accepted, whatever
sentence the court gives you will be based on nothing else but an independent
investigation of the nature and circumstances of the crime, the harm or damage
done, your past background, and the prospects for your becoming a good citizen
in the future?
(20) Attach separately a stipulation of the facts of the crime to which you
offer to plead guilty and your participation in the crime. (In other words, tell
the Court what happened and why you believe you are guilty).
The defendant's response, along with a factual stipulation wherein the
defendant formally waives all antecedent proceedings, as well as trial and its
consequences, should include a sworn admission of the truth of the indictment
or information, original or amended, and a full confession of the crime and
the defendant's participation therein.
When the guilty plea ritual commences, the judge should first answer ques-
tions, if any, posed by the defendant's Response, following defense counsel's
opening recitation of full observation of constitutional and legal safeguards. The
defendant should then be sworn and admonished by the Court again as to the
consequences of the plea, plus perjury possibilities. After careful questioning
by the court as to full understanding and positive ascertainment of the truth of
the defendant's overt'participation in the facts of the crime, the plea of guilty
should be accepted.
In the event the defendant has refused the services of counsel, the judge
should certify such fact, plus the judicial conclusion that appointment of counsel
against the wishes of the defendant would not operate to the defendant's benefit.
The defendant should sign, under oath, such waiver of counsel in advance of the
certification by the judge.
Perfection of guilty plea acceptance, no matter how routine it might seem,
is nonetheless equivalent to correct and proper jury instructions. Accordingly,
the judge should certify the plea. The following idea is posed.
CERTIFICATION OF GUILTY PLEA ACCEPTANCE
(1) The original charge was
as charged by the indictment/information dated
(2) On the day of , the defendant entered a
plea of guilty before me to the charge of
(3) Before and during h.. offer of said guilty plea, said defendant was
fully advised and fully waived all constitutional rights and defenses, federal and
state.
(4) Accordingly, I find that said guilty plea was properly entered; that
the defendant was of sound mind both at the time of the commission of the crime
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and at the time of h- guilty plea and that the same was h-. free and vol-
untary act, being without coercion and/or inducement and with full knowledge and
understanding of all possible consequences of such plea of guilty.
(5) On the - day of ,. . I sentenced
said defendant to
Judge
